Laboratory Safety

IUEHS works with researchers and IUPD, in accordance with US DEA guidance, to properly manage disposal of controlled substances on campus.

Description of the video:

0:03
Yes, hi, this is Chris Kohler from Environmental Health and Safety.
0:06
Can you send an officer over to the loading dock at Chemistry to witness a controlled
0:12
substance disposal?
After analyzing information on 120 explosions, fires, and chemical releases at academic and research laboratories, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board produced this video analyzing hazards associated with conducting research in chemical laboratories at research and academic institutions. The video focuses on three incidents that resulted in death and serious bodily injury.

Description of the video:

00:06
we'd like people to remember that Shari
00:09
was 23 years old the day she went to
00:12
work at UCLA for the last time that she
00:16
was a young girl living her life to the
00:18
fullest she really really wanted to make
00:21
a difference in the world she really
00:23
wanted to change it Shahar bono Sanji
00:26
Shari to her friends was employed as a
00:29
laboratory research assistant at the
00:31
University of California Los Angeles she
00:34
had just received her bachelor's degree
00:35
in chemistry and was applying to law
00:37
schools on December 29th 2008 miss Angie
00:42
was transferring a highly reactive
00:44
chemical when some of it sprayed onto
00:47
her hands and synthetic sweater and
00:49
spontaneously ignited Sherry's older
00:53
sister Naveen Sanji now a surgical
00:55
resident at Harvard recalls the day of
00:58
the accident when my phone rang
01:00
unexpectedly and I saw that Shari was
01:03
calling me I thought she was going to
01:05
tell me about another law school that
01:07
she'd heard from and it turned out to be
01:09
a social worker from the UCLA Medical
01:11
Center who told me what happened and I
01:15
was in shock she had deep third-degree
01:19
burns - over 40% of her body Sheri
01:23
Sangji died from her injuries 18 days
01:26
after the laboratory accident there was
01:28
a life ahead that she was really looking
01:30
forward to that was cut short by what
01:34
happened to her at UCLA
01:44
accidents in research laboratories are
01:47
not isolated events since 2001 the CSB
01:50
has gathered preliminary information on
01:53
120 explosions fires and chemical
01:57
releases at university laboratories and
01:59
other research facilities around the
02:02
country the accidents have caused deaths
02:04
serious injuries and extensive property
02:08
damage this csb video reports on three
02:12
laboratory accidents the 2008 fatality
02:15
at UCLA a death by accidental poisoning
02:18
of a highly regarded Dartmouth college
02:20
professor in 1997 and a 2010 explosion
02:25
at Texas Tech University or TTU that
02:28
severely injured a graduate student it
02:32
would be a shame if not every University
02:33
stopped what it was doing whenever a
02:36
major accident happens like @tt you like
02:39
at UCLA and take it as an opportunity to
02:41
examine their own safety practices to
02:44
determine what similarities there are
02:47
the CSB investigated the Texas Tech
02:50
accident producing a case study that the
02:52
Board believes includes important safety
02:55
lessons for academia as a whole the CSB
02:58
is concerned with laboratory safety
03:00
because it's an area that appears in
03:02
comparison to industry pretty
03:05
unregulated there is a notion at
03:07
laboratory standard but it's focuses on
03:09
exposure hazards and health hazards of
03:11
the research work being conducted
03:13
University Research is a large and
03:15
highly competitive enterprise the CSB
03:18
estimates there are over 110,000
03:21
graduate students and postdoctoral
03:23
researchers working in academic
03:26
laboratories across the u.s. government
03:28
agencies and private organizations spend
03:31
billions of dollars sponsoring research
03:34
at university labs academic institutions
03:37
principal investigators and lab workers
03:40
face significant pressures to innovate
03:43
achieve and gain funding and recognition
03:46
for their work research conducted at
03:49
university laboratories is often on the
03:52
forefront of technology and innovation
03:54
it is important that this research
03:57
continues and tries but it must be done
04:01
within a strong safety culture we're
04:04
preventing hazards is an important value
04:15
on December 29th 2008 when most of the
04:19
campus was closed for holiday vacation
04:21
Sheri Sangji was working on a research
04:24
project at the UCLA chemistry department
04:26
according to a report by California
04:29
State osha ms sanjay was using a syringe
04:32
to transfer a solution of tertiary butyl
04:35
lithium a dangerous pyrophoric chemical
04:38
that ignites spontaneously on contact
04:41
with air somehow the plunger came out of
04:45
the syringe barrel and the chemical is
04:47
exposed to air it caught on fire she
04:50
also had an open flask of a flammable
04:53
solvent in the hood where she was
04:55
working she knocked that over that
04:57
caught fire as well chemist dr. Gillian
05:00
Kemsley reported extensively about the
05:03
UCLA accident for chemical and
05:05
engineering news using documents
05:08
obtained under California open records
05:10
laws my reaction to the news of Sherry's
05:15
death was just shocked and I think
05:19
pretty much the entire chemistry
05:21
community was shocked
05:22
California OSHA cited UCLA's chemistry
05:26
department for failing to require
05:28
appropriate body protection for
05:30
laboratory workers handling pyrophoric
05:32
materials an internal UCLA safety
05:35
inspection of the same laboratory just
05:38
two months prior to the accident found
05:40
that personal protective equipment was
05:43
not fully utilized by laboratory
05:45
personnel yet on the day of the accident
05:47
Ms Sanji had neither a flame resistant
05:50
lab coat nor the much more extensive
05:52
protective clothing recommended by
05:55
manufacturers of pyrophoric chemicals
05:57
dr. Kemsley believes that even a flame
06:00
resistant lab coat would have helped the
06:04
flame resistant lab coat would have
06:07
given more time to react it would have
06:09
slowed the progress of the fire and
06:13
probably would have meant that her
06:15
injuries were less severe and though the
06:17
university said it provided adequate
06:19
safety training for workers California
06:22
OSHA found no documented evidence of
06:24
this this accident has affected the
06:27
campus in a profound way
06:29
from from my office to the pis to the
06:33
Chancellor in the upper administration
06:34
and we all recognize that we had to make
06:37
some changes to our program this further
06:39
strengthen it dr. James Gibson director
06:43
of UCLA's environment Health and Safety
06:45
Office says UCLA has taken steps to
06:48
improve safety accountability and
06:50
oversight improve training provide
06:53
proper protective equipment conduct
06:56
unannounced safety inspections and
06:58
improve laboratory safety culture it's
07:02
not going to happen overnight that is
07:03
something that's going to be a multiple
07:05
year process to really change the safety
07:08
culture to where we think we should be
07:10
and dr. Gibson urges other universities
07:12
to take steps to improve their education
07:15
training and safety culture once we get
07:18
people to do that we're going to see a
07:19
dramatic decrease in the number of
07:21
accidents that occur one of our main
07:24
aims is to try and make sure that this
07:27
doesn't happen again and that no one has
07:30
to go through what we went through a
07:32
lost life is not just an anonymous loss
07:35
of life but real people and families are
07:38
profoundly affected safety has to be an
07:41
absolute priority and the first priority
07:43
for any laboratory
07:56
in August 1996 acclaimed professor karen
08:00
wetterhahn was conducting research on
08:03
the biological impacts of heavy metals
08:05
in her lab at Dartmouth College she was
08:08
working with small amounts of a highly
08:10
toxic compound called dimethyl mercury
08:13
she used a mechanical pipetting device
08:16
to transfer the liquid compound while
08:18
wearing latex rubber gloves during this
08:21
process she later told colleagues one or
08:24
two drops landed on her gloved left hand
08:28
dr. John Wynne is a professor of
08:30
chemistry at Dartmouth College where he
08:32
has worked for almost 30 years at the
08:35
time of karen wetterhahn zak Siddhant he
08:37
was chair of the chemistry department
08:39
she was not aware that she was in any
08:42
peril at the time she cleaned up the
08:44
accident disposed of her gloves properly
08:46
everything had been carried out in a
08:48
appropriate fume hood in her laboratory
08:51
and that was that the spill was not
08:55
considered by her significant enough to
08:57
report she was in no danger as far as
09:00
she knew at the time professor Wynne
09:03
said no one in the department knew that
09:06
dimethyl mercury could seep through the
09:08
latex rubber gloves worn by professor
09:10
wetterhahn but five months later in
09:13
January 1997 she began to show serious
09:17
neurologic symptoms as her balance gait
09:20
and speech deteriorated rapidly despite
09:24
medical treatment for heavy metal
09:26
poisoning three weeks later she became
09:28
unresponsive and died in June 1997 10
09:33
months after the accident I think we
09:36
were all stunned not only that it was
09:39
caring a very careful and capable
09:41
researcher but to find that such a
09:45
seemingly innocuous event could have led
09:48
to what ultimately was Karen's death was
09:51
just unimaginably shocking according to
09:55
Dartmouth officials professor wetterhahn
09:57
had consulted the material safety data
09:59
sheet for dimethyl mercury which advised
10:02
the use of latex rubber gloves when
10:04
handling the material professor Wynn
10:06
says the tragedy led the unit
10:08
versity to emphasize the need for
10:10
comprehensive hazard evaluations rather
10:13
than relying exclusively on the safety
10:16
precautions from chemical suppliers
10:18
there was an increase in that sort of
10:20
safety instruction in the sense that it
10:24
expanded into things that we had not
10:28
realized required such care and details
10:31
such as glove material the fact that she
10:34
was doing something any of us would have
10:36
done in terms of the care she took to
10:39
transfer the small amount of material
10:42
was for all of us the wake-up call the
10:47
signal event that says whenever
10:50
confronted with a material known to be
10:52
toxic at whatever level whether super
10:55
toxic as this one was or not we must be
10:59
diligent learn all we can from as many
11:01
experts as we can about the nature of
11:04
the hazard and about the protections
11:06
that can be taken to handle it safely
11:20
in January 2010 two graduate students at
11:24
Texas Tech University were conducting
11:26
research on energetic or explosive
11:29
compounds funded by the US Department of
11:32
Homeland Security the students were
11:34
tasked with synthesizing and performing
11:36
tests on a new compound a derivative of
11:39
nickel hydrazine perchlorate initially
11:42
the compound was made in small batches
11:43
of less than 300 milligrams but the two
11:46
students were concerned about potential
11:49
variability among different small
11:50
batches of the compound which could
11:53
affect later test results so they
11:55
decided to scale up the synthesis to
11:58
make a single batch of approximately 10
12:00
grams enough for all of their testing
12:02
they believed that keeping the solid
12:05
compound wet with a solvent would keep
12:08
it from exploding after producing the
12:10
larger batch the more senior graduate
12:13
student observed that it contained
12:14
clumps that he believed needed to be
12:17
broken up prior to testing while wearing
12:19
safety goggles he transferred half of
12:22
the new compound into a mortar covered
12:25
the compound with the solvent and used a
12:27
pestle to gently break up the clumps
12:30
after some time he took his goggles off
12:33
and walked away a short time later he
12:35
decided to stir the compound once again
12:38
he did not replace his goggles as the
12:42
pestle pressed against the compound it
12:44
detonated the graduate student was
12:47
seriously injured his left hand severely
12:50
damaged by the force of the explosion
12:51
causing the loss of three fingers
12:54
perforation of his eye and cuts and
12:57
burns to other parts of his body post
12:59
accident photos and video show extensive
13:02
damage as the explosion fractured the
13:04
lab bench shattered bottles and sprayed
13:07
the lab with projectiles professor
13:10
Dominick Casa Dante was head of the
13:12
Texas Tech chemistry department at the
13:14
time of the accident
13:16
from my perspective as department chair
13:18
you go through the emotional trauma oh
13:21
my gosh
13:22
somebody that I know has gotten very
13:24
seriously hurt - soul-searching why did
13:27
this happen
13:28
with these academic incidents people
13:31
like to focus on the immediate actions
13:33
of the individual involved and try to
13:34
poke holes and and with hindsight you
13:37
know cert some sort of blame on the
13:40
incident on the individual involved and
13:41
what we have to recognize is that there
13:43
are bigger systems at play here that can
13:46
influence safety the CSB investigation
13:49
at Texas Tech found deficiencies in each
13:52
layer of safety management within the
13:54
institution
13:55
these included in sufficient safety
13:57
accountability and oversight by the
13:59
principal investigators the chemistry
14:02
department and the university's
14:03
administration and according to
14:05
investigators there were also important
14:08
gaps beyond the university itself I
14:10
think that the way we were a year and a
14:13
half ago is pretty representative of the
14:16
way that a lot of universities
14:18
especially chemistry departments are
14:19
around the country the main lesson I
14:22
would really like and it's the way that
14:24
I start a lot of my talks and safety is
14:26
there but for the grace of God go you as
14:29
to say your universities the victim at
14:32
Texas Tech had been working on the
14:34
energetic materials project for about a
14:36
year at the time of the accident but the
14:39
CSB found that he did not receive any
14:41
specific formal training on working with
14:44
potentially explosive compounds the two
14:47
principal investigators believed they
14:49
had verbally established a 100 milligram
14:52
limit on the production of energetic
14:53
materials but the CSB investigation
14:56
found there was no formal system for
14:59
communicating this limit or verifying
15:01
compliance none of the lab researchers
15:04
believed that a strict 100 milligram
15:06
limit existed when graduate students go
15:10
into these new endeavors a new project a
15:13
new process they need to get specific
15:16
training and they need to have it
15:17
insured and have it assessed do they
15:19
really understand what it is they're
15:21
doing and the CSB found that the use of
15:23
personal protective equipment within
15:25
Texas Tech laboratories was not
15:28
consistently enforced when we were at
15:30
TTU we learned that many people made the
15:34
decision whether or not to wear their
15:35
personal protective equipment based on
15:38
the level of danger they felt that
15:40
they're about to under
15:41
take one of the issues that the CSB
15:43
examined with the TTU incident was
15:45
safety accountability
15:47
how do universities and academic
15:48
institutions ensure that people are
15:51
working in safe environment what we
15:52
found at 80 tu was that the
15:54
organizational structure was such that
15:56
individuals that were responsible for
15:58
doing safety inspections did not have
16:00
direct authority or oversight over the
16:03
principal investigators and their
16:04
laboratories prior to the accident the
16:07
the whole safety management structure
16:10
reported to the vice president for
16:13
administration and Finance after this
16:16
accident the provost and the president
16:18
and I looked at this very carefully and
16:21
decided that a new reporting structure
16:23
was required dr. Taylor amy is the vice
16:26
president for research at Texas Tech
16:29
University since the accident
16:31
Texas Tech has modified its
16:33
organizational structure so that the
16:35
Environmental Health and Safety Director
16:37
reports to dr. Amy who also has
16:40
authority over the principal
16:42
investigators we did this because we
16:45
wanted to have the safety culture this
16:48
changing safety culture to have a chance
16:50
to grow and become part of the fabric of
16:53
the institution we we needed to connect
16:55
it more closely to the academic life of
16:58
faculty the CSB investigation determined
17:01
there had been two previous near-misses
17:03
within the laboratories of the same
17:05
principal investigators since 2007 while
17:10
no one was injured
17:11
CSB investigators concluded there were
17:13
similarities in the causes of these
17:15
incidents to the January 2010 explosion
17:18
but these key lessons were missed at the
17:22
time of the earlier incidents the CSB
17:24
would like to see TTU and really all
17:27
universities create a tracking system to
17:30
document the accidents that are
17:31
happening so that they can facilitate
17:33
learning not just in the laboratory
17:35
where the accident happened but really
17:36
in all laboratories one of the areas
17:38
that the CSB examined with the TTU case
17:40
was the role of the grant funding agency
17:44
in regard to safety the CSB determined
17:47
that the Department of Homeland Security
17:49
which funded the research at Texas Tech
17:51
through an agreement with Northeastern
17:53
University
17:54
had a general condition stating that the
17:57
safety of researchers was the
17:59
responsibility of the various host
18:00
institutions however DHS did not impose
18:04
any specific safety requirements for
18:07
research with energetic materials and
18:09
Texas Tech did not evaluate the hazards
18:12
or develop any specific University
18:14
safety policies grant funding bodies can
18:17
play a huge role in influencing safety
18:19
by including stipulations and
18:21
requirements in their grant applications
18:24
because Texas Tech is a public
18:26
institution in a state that lacks its
18:29
own workplace safety program it is not
18:31
required to abide by the federal osha
18:33
laboratory safety standard but Texas
18:36
Tech officials did voluntarily develop a
18:39
chemical hygiene plan using the OSHA
18:41
laboratory standard as guidance when you
18:45
look at OSHA's laboratory standard
18:47
though it also focuses on health hazards
18:49
of chemicals not physical hazards of
18:52
chemicals that almost can lead one to
18:54
decide that it precludes the need for
18:56
writing standard operating procedures
18:58
when working with chemicals that provide
19:00
large physical hazards fires explosions
19:04
etc to highlight this gap in the
19:07
laboratory standard the CSB recommended
19:10
that OSHA issue a safety bulletin on the
19:13
importance of controlling physical
19:14
hazards of chemicals in the laboratory
19:17
and the CSB noted that no comprehensive
19:21
guidance exists for conducting hazard
19:23
evaluations within the dynamic
19:25
environment of academic research
19:27
laboratories there's a lot of good
19:29
suggestions and kind of hints at how to
19:31
do it but there's not a comprehensive
19:34
guidance on how to conduct thorough
19:35
hazard evaluations for these graduate
19:38
students who arguing much more
19:40
independent research work as a result
19:43
the Chemical Safety Board recommended
19:45
that the American Chemical Society
19:48
develop a methodology for evaluating and
19:51
controlling hazards in academic research
19:53
laboratories the board also recommended
19:56
that Texas Tech University should revise
19:59
and expand its chemical hygiene plan to
20:02
ensure that the physical hazards of
20:04
chemicals are controlled and develop and
20:07
implement
20:07
and incident and near-miss reporting
20:10
system there's a lot of momentum here
20:13
for safety consciousness on campus but
20:17
it shouldn't have had to come to that
20:19
don't wait for a serious accident to
20:22
happen on your campus to begin to think
20:26
about safety and transform your own
20:29
culture when we think about the role of
20:40
principal investigators and senior
20:45
campus administrators in lab safety
20:47
programs I have concerns because in many
20:52
places I feel they are not providing the
20:57
leadership in this that's needed dr.
21:00
James Kaufman is the president of the
21:02
laboratory Safety Institute a nonprofit
21:05
organization which provides safety
21:07
training for universities academic
21:10
institutions encourage their students to
21:13
achieve excellence in their work they
21:17
need to apply that same high standard to
21:20
their laboratory safety programs
21:24
environmental health and safety programs
21:26
to achieve a high safety standard the
21:30
CSB investigation identified key
21:32
laboratory safety lessons for
21:34
universities ensure that research
21:37
specific hazards are evaluated and then
21:40
controlled by developing specific
21:42
written protocols and training expand
21:45
existing laboratory safety plans to
21:47
address the physical hazards of
21:49
chemicals ensure that safety personnel
21:52
report directly to a university official
21:55
who has the authority to oversee
21:57
research laboratories and implement
21:59
safety improvements document and
22:02
communicate all laboratory near-misses
22:05
and incidents you know I have a PhD in
22:10
physical chemistry and I have a lab
22:12
safety story I could pull together many
22:16
friends and we could sit in a room
22:18
and share our lab safety stories that
22:21
should make us stop and ask these
22:23
stories that we can share those of us
22:25
who've gone through the graduate program
22:26
you know are those just stories are
22:29
those really opportunities to ensure
22:30
that nobody dies again or nobody is
22:34
seriously injured again at least to the
22:35
best of our abilities exploring the
22:38
unknown doing research always involves
22:40
risks those risks are worth taking we
22:43
know that as a society and as a society
22:46
we owe it to ourselves to do them in the
22:49
most efficacious and safe ways we can be
22:53
seize be calls on universities to study
22:56
the key lessons from our Texas stack
22:59
accident investigation and do everything
23:02
possible to provide safe working
23:04
environments in their laboratories thank
23:08
you for watching the CSB safety video to
23:12
obtain the CS B's case study on the
23:15
Texas Tech University laboratory
23:16
accident please visit CSD gov
24:01
you